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Abstract
Since Henry George (1839-1897) economists have been arguing that a tax on unim-
proved land is an ideal tax on eﬃciency grounds. Output taxes, on the other hand,
have distortionary eﬀects on the economy. This paper shows that under asymmetric
information output taxes might be used along with land tax in order to implement
an optimal taxation scheme in a Latin American context, i.e., where land rental mar-
kets are relatively thin, land property provides non-agricultural payoﬀs and there is
nonrevenue objectives of land taxation. Also, the model has two implications that
can be tested empirically: (i) there is evasion when schemes based only on land
taxes are implemented; (ii) this evasion is more severe for large landholders.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H21, H26, Q15
Key words: Optimal taxation, tax evasion, land use.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Taxes on land are among the oldest forms of taxation. Arnott and Stiglitz
(1979), extending the so-called Henry George theorem, demonstrate that a
tax on land rents is not only eﬃcient, but the only tax instrument necessary
to ﬁnance a pure public good in large economies where the diﬀerential land
rents are well deﬁned and the distribution of economic activity over spaceis Pareto optimal. On the other hand, land taxation is one of the few cases
of a lump-sum tax, since it is based on assets rather than on agricultural
production. However, while land taxation enjoys striking advantages from a
theoretical point of view, it remains barely used in developing countries. Trying
to explain this fact, Skinner (1991a) indicates two major drawbacks of land
taxes relative to output taxes - it increases risk borne by farmers and it also
entails high administrative costs. Hoﬀ (1991) points to the use of a mix of
land and output taxes as an attempt to mitigate the adverse eﬀect of a pure
land taxation regime in an economy with imperfect insurance markets.
In this paper, the mix of land and output taxes arises as the optimal tax-
ation instrument in an economy where farmer’s ability, and therefore land
use, is private information. We show that the problem of informational costs
raised by Skinner (1991a) can be at least partially resolved in a typical Latin
American country by using an output tax as a part of the tax mechanism.
This additional component takes advantage from the fact that the informa-
tion about agricultural output is more reliable than self-reported indicators of
productivity.
Many countries in Latin America have attempted to implement progressive
land taxes in order to induce large landholders to use their land more in-
tensively rather than to ﬁnance local government. Progressive tax rates are
treated as a means of dissuading land speculation, inducing large landowners
to sell out or use land more eﬃciently. Implementation of this instrument has
been disappointing - farmers often ﬁnd ways around such taxes. 1 In Brazil,
for example, the enactment of the Land Statute in 1964 imposed nonrevenue
f u n c t i o n so nl a n dt a x a t i o n ,w h i c hi np r i n c i p a lw a st o o ko nt h ej o bo fa s s i s t i n g
public land redistribution policies. 2 Since then, the land tax mechanism aims
at imposing penalties on unimproved land. Nevertheless, the original objec-
tives of the tax were not achieved. Land taxes in Brazil had never constituted
a good source of revenue and further, hardly managed to achieve any of the
desired changes in the rural environment.
Land ownership in the model can be used for agricultural production or for
other non-agricultural purpose. Land is used not only as a productive asset
but also as a source of other beneﬁts - “as a hedge against inﬂation, as an
asset that can be liquidated to smooth consumption in the face of risk, as
collateral for access to loans, as a tax shelter, or as a means of laundering
illicits funds” [De Janvry, Key and Sadoulet (1997)]. Therefore, we consider a
continuum of types of producers who are diﬀerentiated by their proclivity for
non-agricultural activity and agricultural productivity. Each producer’s type
1 Cf. e.g. Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995), Deininger and Feder (2000),
Bird and Slack (2002).
2 See Oliveira (1993).
2constitutes private information and the area under cultivation is not observed.
Land rental markets in Latin America are underdeveloped. Typically only 5
to 10% of the land is rented out, which is remarkably low when compared
to United States or Europe patterns. A large body of literature has been
theoretically addressing the reasons for the imperfections in the land rental
market. 3 Many reasons provide explanations for a reduction in the share of
output appropriated by the tenants. Speciﬁcally, a factor that is likely to be
important in most Latin American countries is the landlord’s fear of loss of the
land [Macours, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2001)]. In the absence of a land rental
market, the farmers with low agricultural productivity cannot use their titles
to obtain non-agricultural gains and also lease-out their land to other farmers
for agricultural production. The only option for them is to retain a portion of
their tracts in the form of idle land. Although farmers with low agricultural
productivity choose separately farm size and cultivated area, those with high
agricultural productivity and low non-agricultural yields choose only the farm
size, since they are constrained by the no rental market constraint. The no
rental market constraint determines two groups of farmers: those who face a
one-dimensional problem of maximization and those who have two diﬀerent
choices (farm size and cultivated area).
Summarily, we study the problem of optimal taxation in an economy where
(i) there are nonrevenue objectives of land taxation; (ii) land provides both
agricultural and non-agricultural payoﬀs; and (iii) the land rental market is
imperfect. The main result is that relying only on land tax is optimal only
when the social planer information about farmers is complete or when farmers
do not hold unimproved land; otherwise, the optimal scheme is a linear combi-
nation of output and land taxes. Under additional assumptions regarding the
relationship between the agricultural and non-agricultural productivities for
diﬀerent farmers, we show that a tax mechanism based solely on land taxes
can be implemented for small farms because they have no idle land. This is
consistent with the Brazilian experience with land taxation, where the diﬃ-
culty of accurately appraising the concept of area utilized determined high
evasion and underreporting, specially for large landholdings.
This paper attempts to ﬁll a gap among optimal taxation models under asym-
metric information, in the tradition initiated by Mirlees (1971), and the land
taxation models mentioned above. The mechanics of our model is quite similar
to that of Stern (1982). Asymmetric information about farmers introduces a
role for output taxes, even considering their distortionary eﬀect. The mix of
3 The basic arguments are: risk sharing [Cheung (1969)], hidden actions and moral
hazard [Stiglitz (1974); Ghatak and Pandey (2000); Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)],
screening [Hallagan (1978) and Allen (1982)] and limited liability constraints [Shetty
(1988); Laﬀont and Matoussi (1995)].
3output and land taxes arises as a solution for the typical trade-oﬀ between rent
extraction and distortion commonly observed in adverse selection models.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 introduces and analyzes the
basic model. In Section 2, we link tax evasion to farm size using an additional
assumption about the ordering of farmers types and present, as an example,
the Brazilian experience with land taxation. The discussion about the assump-
tions adopted, the generality of the results and implications for public policies
is made in Section 3. Concluding comments are oﬀered in Section 4.
2 The Model





distributed according to the distribution function F. The parameter θ reﬂects
the technology available for each farmer, indicating the revenues obtained from
agricultural and non-agricultural land use.
The analysis is carried out in a partial equilibrium environment. The price
obtained for agricultural output is normalized at 1, an unlimited quantity of
land is available at price p and each harvested hectare costs w.F o rt h es a k e
of simpliﬁcation, we assume that labor and other inputs are used in ﬁxed
proportions with land at a cost w per hectare. Both production and land are
perfectly homogeneous.
Af a r m e ro ft y p eθ who holds T hectares of land, grows A and pays a transfer
t to the social planner, obtains proﬁts given by:
Π = Q(A,θ)+φ(T,θ) − wA− pT − t, (1)
where Q and φ are respectively the agricultural and non-agricultural produc-
tion functions, with QA > 0, QAA < 0, φT > 0, φTT < 0, QA (0,·)=∞,
QA (∞,·)=0 , φT (0,·)=∞ and φT (∞,·)=0 .
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume θ aﬀects Q and φ linearly. 4 The
technology is such that θ is positively related to the non-agricultural beneﬁts
and marginal beneﬁts of landholding. The eﬀect of θ on Q is considered later.
Initially, it can be positive or negative. These preliminary functional-form
hypothesis are summarized as:
Assumption A1: Qθθ (x,θ)=φθθ (x,θ)=0 , φθ (x,θ) > 0 and φTθ(x,θ) > 0
for every x ∈ < and θ ∈ Θ.
4 This condition avoids assumptions regarding third derivatives which generally
have little economic insight.
4We assume there is no rental market and hence the choice of each producer
must respect the condition A ≤ T. Thus, based on a taxation scheme t,f a r m e r s
are faced with the program:
max
A,T Π st. A ≤ T. (P)
Individuals decide to participate whenever Π ≥ 0.
The social planner’s utility function is deﬁned by
U = t − λφ(T,θ), (2)
where λ ∈ [0,1] is the social cost attributed to the non-agricultural use of land.
This reduced-form utility means that the social planner designs a tax mecha-
nism in order to maximize the tax revenue and to hinder the non-agricultural
motive of landholding.
2.1 The ﬁrst-best case
Initially, we consider the design of a tax mechanism in an environment of com-
plete information, i.e., we assume the social planner can exactly observe the
type of agents and manages to establish tax collection rules that consider pre-
cisely the willingness of each producer to use land for agricultural production
or not. This is an initial analysis to establish the benchmark case.
Under complete information, the social planner can determine the allocations
for each producer via a punitive taxation scheme. The choice of the tax scheme
is restricted only by the participation constraint (IR) and the absence of a land
rental market (RM). The ﬁrst-best program in this case deﬁnes the optimal




Π ≥ 0, (IR)
A ≤ T. (RM)
First, note that (IR) is binding. Otherwise, the social planner could reach
a higher level of U increasing t marginally, without violate (IR) or (RM).
Therefore, the transfers required by the optimal tax scheme represent all the
producer’s proﬁts.


















where µ∗ is the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the constraint (RM).
Deﬁne ΘC = {θ ∈ Θ : µ∗ > 0} and ΘU = Θ − ΘC. While farmers in ΘC (con-
strained farmers) harvest all land they have, those in ΘU (unconstrained farm-
ers) hold some amount of idle land.
When λ =0 , the social planner is not bothered by the non-agricultural use
of land, and the choices of A and T are not aﬀected by the tax mechanism. If
λ =1 , equation (3b) determines that ΘC = Θ, i.e., there is no idle land in the
optimal taxation scheme. The shadow price of the rental market constraint in
the latter case becomes constant and equal to the price of land for all θ ∈ Θ.
The following result shows that the optimal tax scheme under complete infor-
mation can be implemented by pure land taxes.
Proposition 1 The solution to the optimal taxation problem (P.FB) can be





∗ = λφT (T∗,θ)= λ
1−λ (p − µ∗) and γ∗ = t∗ − β
∗T∗.
PROOF. Consider t = β
∗T +γ∗,w h e r eβ
∗ and γ∗ are deﬁned as above. The
ﬁrst-order conditions for (P) can be written as:
QA (A,θ)=w + µ,
φT (T,θ)=p + β
∗ − µ,
µ(A − T)=0 .
Using the deﬁnition of β
∗ it is easy to check that the system above is equivalent
to the system (3). The value of γ∗ adjusts the level of the transfers in order
to satisfy (IR) with equality.
5 Hereafter, for the ease of notation, we write µ∗ (θ) as µ∗, A∗ (θ) as A∗, T∗ (θ) as
T∗,a n ds oo n .
6Proposition 1 shows that the social planner can implement the optimal tax
scheme under complete information oﬀering a pair (β
∗,γ∗) to the producer of
type θ. Solving (P), each farmer chooses the amounts of A and T determined by
(P.FB). The tax rate increases with λ and mitigates non-agricultural purposes
of landholding. If λ =0 , the government does not distort the choice of the
farm size by not taxing the ownership of land. If λ =1 , on the other hand,
t h e r ei sn oi d l el a n da f t e rt a x a t i o n .
In ΘU,w eg e taﬂat rate β
∗ = λ
1−λp which does not vary according to the type
of producer. Thus, the model shows that in a context of complete information,
one may use a single rate for all producers operating with unimproved land.
If the social planner could precisely observe landowner productivity param-
eters, there is a pure land tax scheme capable of implementing the optimal
taxation schedule. In this solution, if λ>0, the social planner discourages the
non-agricultural use of land, and with λ =1 , there would be no idle land in
equilibrium.
2.2 The second-best case
Consider now a more realistic case in which θ is private information. The
choice of the optimal taxation scheme becomes a typical mechanism design
problem. The revelation principle ensures it is suﬃcient to concentrate on a
direct mechanism that induces truthful revelation of the ﬁrm’s cost parame-
ter. Each mechanism is an allocation determined by a set of three functions
(t,A,T) deﬁned on Θ and should be interpreted as the principal collecting a
tax t in exchange for a choice (A,T).









− w ˆ A − pˆ T − ˆ t.












. The truth-telling requirement
establishes a restriction on the set of all feasible mechanisms which can be
summarized in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 An allocation (t,A,T) is implementable if, and only if,
Π(θ|θ) ≥ Π(ˆ θ|θ) ∀ θ,ˆ θ ∈ Θ. (4)
7Every implementable allocation is such that the agent is interested in revealing
his correct type rather than untruthfully declaring himself to be of some other
type. Therefore, equation (4) is a translation of the revelation principle for
which the next result establishes a more tractable form based on Guesnerie
and Laﬀont (1984).
Lemma 3 If the allocation (t,A,T) is implementable and piecewise C1 then
d
dθ
Π(θ|θ)=Qθ (A,θ)+φθ (T,θ), (IC1)
and
QAθ (A,θ) ˙ A + φTθ(T,θ) ˙ T ≥ 0, a.s. in Θ. (IC2)
Additionally, (IC1)a n d( IC2)a r es u ﬃcient for implementability if (t,A,T)
is continuous with absolutely continuous ﬁrst derivatives.
PROOF. see appendix.






[t − λφ(T,θ)]dF (θ) (P.SB)
subject to (IC1), (IC2),
Π(θ|θ) ≥ 0, (IRθ)
and
A ≤ T. (RMθ)
In order to solve the program above using the standard techniques, we need
a condition of sorting regarding the eﬀect of θ on Q and φ.
Assumption A2: Qθ (x,θ)+φθ (x,θ) > 0 for every x ∈ <.
Assumption (A2) establishes that, holding the farm size ﬁxed, farmers with
higher values of θ c a no b t a i nal a r g e rp a y o ﬀ. Under (A2), conditions (RMθ)
and (IC1)i m p l y( IRθ)i sb i n d i n go n l yf o rθ = θ. Otherwise, the social planner
could improve by increasing tθ without violating the constraints.






subject to (IC2), (IRθ)a n d( RMθ), where
Ψ(A,T,θ) ≡ Q(A,θ)−wA+(1 − λ)φ(T,θ)−pT−
1 − F (θ)
f (θ)
(Qθ (A,θ)+φθ (T,θ)).
Notice that ΨAT =0 . We make the following assumption to assure the use of
a ﬁrst-order approach for the maximization program above:
Assumption A3: Ψ is concave and has a unique interior maximum for each
θ ∈ Θ.






















dˆ θ, obtained from the integration of (IC1). If (IC2)
is veriﬁed for every pair (A∗∗,T∗∗) in Θ, the solution of (P.SB)i sc o m p l e t e l y
deﬁned by the system (5) and t∗∗ under (A3). Otherwise, the “ironing princi-
ple” would be used in the solution. We avoid this possibility by imposing the
next two assumptions.





1 − F (θ)
!
≥ 0.
Assumption A5: QAθ (x,θ)+( 1− λ)φTθ(x,θ) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ <.
Assumptions (A4) and (A5) are commonly adopted in the literature. Condition
(A4) is satisﬁed for several common distributions such as the uniform, normal,
logistic and exponential, for example. Assumption (A5) is a sorting condition
establishing that a marginal increase in θ determines an increase on the total
revenue from landholding, even if QAθ < 0. This assumption is the single
crossing condition applied to our model. The next result shows that (A1)-
(A5) are suﬃcient to characterize (5) as the unique solution for (P.SB).
9Lemma 4 Suppose that (A1)-(A5) are satisﬁed. Then the solution of (P.SB)
is determined by the system (5) along with t∗∗.
PROOF. see appendix.
The result above shows that the best direct revelation tax mechanism is given
by the triple (t∗∗,A ∗∗,T∗∗). Under this mechanism, each farmer is induced to
announce that his type is the true θ receiving the allocation (A∗∗,T∗∗) and
paying t∗∗. However, there are more reasonable mechanisms which yield the
same results derived above. The implementation of the optimal solution via a
menu of linear taxes is presented on next proposition. Similarly to the ﬁrst-best
case, let ˜ ΘC = {θ ∈ Θ : µ∗∗ > 0} and ˜ ΘU = Θ − ˜ ΘC.
Since θ is the only private information of farmers, the social planner can infer
as p e c i ﬁc set of achievable allocations. We can deﬁne Ωi = {(Q,T):Q =
Q(A∗∗,θ) and T = T∗∗ for some θ ∈ ˜ Θi}, i ∈ {C,U},a n dΩ = ΩC ∪ ΩU as
the set of feasible allocations. The social planner knows that any pair (Q,T)
which is not in Ω is not compatible to the rational behavior of the farmers.
Proposition 5 Under (A1)-(A5), the solution of (P.SB) can be decentralized
by a menu of linear taxes through the following mechanism: (i) the social
planner announces a tax schedule based on the observable variables T (farm
size) and Q (agricultural output) of the form
t(Q,T)=α(Q)Q + β (T)T + γ (Q,T);
(ii) given the tax schedule t(Q,T) f a r m e r so fe a c ht y p ec h o o s eQ and T; (iii)
the social planner observes T and Q and collects t(Q,T). The tax schedule
is such that α(Q)=0whenever exists some T for which (Q,T) ∈ ΩC and γ
does not distort the choice of Q and T,i . e . ,γQ (Q,T)=γT (Q,T)=0for all
(Q,T) ∈ Ω.
PROOF. see appendix.
The total tax is constituted by a three-part tariﬀ: an output tax, a land
tax and a ﬁxed part. Proposition 5 shows that the scheme put forward as
a solution for the model with complete information cannot be implemented
under asymmetric information, i.e., it is not possible to implement the optimal
10tax mechanism relying only on land taxes. For farmers with idle land it is
necessary the use of output taxes along with land taxes in order to obtain the
optimal allocation. Notice that the ﬁxed part does not alter the choices of the
cultivated area A and farm size T a n di ti su s e do n l yt oe x t r a c tr e n tf r o mt h e
farmers.
3F a r m s i z e a n d T a x E v a s i o n
This section examine some implications of the previous analysis for land tax-
ation in Latin American countries, exploring the contents of Proposition 5.
Despite the absence of a land rental market, there is a consensus regarding
the existence of a dualism in agrarian organization in Latin America. Small
farmers with high yields per hectare coexist with less productive large land-
holders. We adopt the next assumption to concentrate our analysis to this
L a t i nA m e r i c a ns i t u a t i o n .
Assumption A6: QAθ (x,θ) < 0 for every x ∈ <.
Under (A6), the types of farmers are such that a higher θ refers to an increase
in the non-agricultural land beneﬁts and a decrease in the agricultural produc-
tivity of land. Farmers with high θ obtain proﬁts mostly from non-agricultural
land use, experiencing lower agricultural productivity. As a consequence, those
farmers are expected to have larger tracts with a smaller cropped area. In
other words, assumptions (A1) and (A6) are suﬃcient to generate an inverse
relationship between farm size and agricultural productivity. 6
Lemma 6 Assume (A1)-(A6). There exists at most one critical type ˜ θ ∈ Θ
such that ˜ ΘC =[ θ,˜ θ) and ˜ ΘU =[ θ
∗,¯ θ].A l s o , ˙ T∗∗ = ˙ A∗∗ > 0 for all farmers in
˜ ΘC, ˙ T∗∗ > 0 and ˙ A∗∗ < 0 for all farmers in ˜ ΘU.
PROOF. see appendix.
6 This inverse relationship between farm size and productivity can be theoreti-
cally explained either by interaction of diﬀerent market imperfections (Feder, 1985;
Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986) or by a self-selection argument (Assunção and Ghatak,
2003). The empirical evidence is vast including; for example, Berry and Cline (1979),
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Benjamin (1995), Barret (1996) and Lamb
(2003).
11Lemma 6 has two important consequences. First, all types are revealed after
taxation and they can be described by the farm size - formally, T∗∗ is an one-





restricted by the rental market constraint. It is also straightforward to obtain
a similar result from (A6) to the complete information case.
Assumption (A6), through lemma 6, provides an easier interpretation for the
contents of proposition 5. The output tax rate should be zero for small farmers
who are restricted by the absence of a land rental market, operating without
i d l el a n d .A st h ef a r ms i z ea n dt h el e v e lo fi d l el a n dr i s e ,t h eo u t p u tr a t er i s e s
as well, while the land tax rate decreases. Even though the tax on output
causes a distortion in resource allocation, its use is justiﬁed by its ability to
compose an implementable (or self-revealing) taxation mechanism, specially
for large landholders. The next proposition summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 7 Under (A1)-(A6), the optimal land taxation problem is such
that: (i) there is evasion when a pure land tax regime is used and ΘU 6= ∅; (ii)
evasion is more severe for large landholders (those with T∗∗ (θ) >T ∗∗ (θ
∗)).
An example: the Brazilian experience
Land tax (Rural Property Tax - ITR) in Brazil, since its creation through
the Land Statute of 1964, has been used to support public policies for land
redistribution. Nevertheless, there is a high level of evasion and default that
hinders its eﬃciency as an instrument of landholding policy. Two large-scale
reforms of ITR were carried out, in 1979 and 1996, but the results have not
suﬃced to overcome the associated problems. According to the current scheme,
the rate would vary from 0.03% to 20% of the land value. The rates diﬀer only
by degree of utilization and total area, and there are sharply progressive rates
in relation to area and regressive ones for the percentage of cropped area, so
that productive properties are beneﬁted.
In an economy such as Brazil’s, where producers operate with idle land and
the government is often in the dark as to the true productivity parameters
of the agricultural and non-agricultural activities available to various land-
holders, proposition 5 shows that there are no tax rates able to make ITR an
optimal taxation scheme. The use of an output tax becomes necessary so that
producers with better access to non-agricultural activities will pay their share
of the tax burden.
A natural way to implement this result, using the prexistent and well-deﬁned
strucuture of the output tax (ICMS), is to consider the tax rate a function
of the farm size and the total output tax collected per hectare. The degree
12of use, which is a non-observable variable, should be replaced by the amount
of ICMS collected per hectare. This implementation has a great potential to
improve not only the application of ITR but also the collection of ICMS. The
scheme proposed implies an additional cost to the evasion and default of ICMS
given by the increase in the ITR tax rate. Therefore, this new reformulation
constitutes a new step toward more reliable tax institutions. Note that only
the information about the ICMS is required in this scheme. Hence, there is no
need for large modiﬁcations in the existent institutions and mechanisms.
This inability to implement ITR as a solution to the problem with asymmet-
ric information gives theoretical support to what the government found by
comparing declared against actual data. According to the Presidential Press
Oﬃce, the percentage of value declared in relation to the real one in the 1980s
varied from 20% for properties of less than 10 hectares down to only 1.2% for
large properties of over 10 thousand hectares. The area reported as usable was
far short of the true ﬁgure as well, with large landowners declaring around 50%
and small ones 94% of the real measure. This casual evidence is compatible
not only with the inadequacy of a pure lad tax regime but also with the fact
that small producers, in general with no idle land, are more likely to correctly
declare their land use.
4 Discussion
We have used a model to study an optimal tax mechanism design problem in
the context of a typical Latin American country. In this section, we describe
the role of each key ingredient in our main results.
S o m ea u t h o r sr e c o g n i z et h a tat a xo nl a n dh a v eb o t hﬁscal and non-ﬁscal
eﬀects. Although it can be an important source to ﬁnance local governments,
it must also be considered from a more general policy perspective. Land taxes
can be an alternative to traditional conﬁscatory land reform programs. Land
taxes might provide an incentive for greater density and best use of land. Based
on this literature, our analysis have also considered nonrevenue objectives for
land taxation. 7
In a more general scenario, we could consider the social planner’s utility func-
tion as U (t,A,T)=t − ψ(A,T),w h e r eψ is strictly decreasing in A and
increasing in T. In other words, the social planner could promote agricultural
production and avoid large landholdings. 8 In this case, it is straightforward to
7 E.g. Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995), Deininger and Feder (2000), Bird
and Slack (2002).
8 This functional form includes the cases in which the social planner combat idle
13check that the use of output tax is always required in a linear implementation
of the optimal taxation scheme, even in the complete information case. There-
fore, relying only on land tax would not be optimal even if the productivity
parameter was publicly observed.
On the other hand, the utility function we have used provides a meaningful
benchmark. It allows us to analyze the need of output taxes as part of the
optimal tax mechanism. A comparison between Proposition 1 and Proposition
5 reveals that asymmetric information may lead the need of output taxes along
with land taxes in order to control both cultivated area and farm size.
Another key feature of our analysis is the non-agricultural component of land
demand. As mentioned before, many reasons have contributed to distort the
allocation of land in favor of large landholders, specially in Latin American
countries. In terms of the model, this is represented by the function φ(T,θ),
which is essential for our analysis. If φ(T,θ)=0for all T and θ,n oi d l el a n d
would exist in equilibrium. In this case, all farmers exploit the full agricultural
capacity of their holdings, keeping A = T. Therefore, ΘU = ˜ ΘU = ∅ and the
optimal tax mechanism can be implemented using only the tax on land in
both cases - complete or incomplete information. The output tax is required
when there is a separation between the choice of cultivated area and farm size.
Finally, we have assumed that the land rental market is absent. If the land
rental market is perfect, the need of output taxes to implement the optimal tax
instrument would be even stronger. An easy way to think about the impact
of a perfect rental market in the model is to set the Lagrangian multipliers of
(RM) and (RMθ) equal to zero to discard these constraints. As a consequence,
the optimal scheme under asymmetric information becomes a mix of land taxes
and output taxes for every farmer. For the complete information case, land
taxes continue to be able of implementing the optimal taxation. However, a
signiﬁcant change occurs to the relationship between farm size and tax evasion.
Despite of the farm size, the tax on land is not able to implement the optimal
tax scheme in the incomplete information case. Therefore, there is no clear
relationship between farm size and tax evasion.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a model of asymmetric information in which a mix of
ouput and land taxes arises as a means of implementing an optimal taxation
mechanism. The model is stripped down to highlight characteristics commonly
land, measured as T/A or T − A.
14observed in Latin American countries. The role of each one in our main propo-
sitions is discussed in last section.
The mechanics of our results is the following. The absence of a land rental
market restrain the cultivated area to be not larger than the farm size. As a
consequence, depending on the proclivity of agricultural and non-agricultural
land use, farmers have one or two key decisions to make. Whenever the land
rental market constraint is binding, the cultivated area is equal to the farm
size and there is only one relevant choice. On the other hand, if the land rental
market constraint is not binding (the case with idle land), farmers choose both
farm size and area under cultivation. While we need only one tax instrument
in the ﬁrst case, the second one requires two of them. Therefore, output taxes
have a key eﬀect in the taxation of those farmers operating with idle land,
even considering its distortionary eﬀect.
The lack of a land rental market along with the assumption regarding the
inverse relationship between farm size and productivity explain not only the
evasion of land taxes but also why it is more severe for large landholders.
Small farmers do not operate with idle land due to their higher agricultural
productivity. Hence, a land tax scheme is more likely to be eﬀective for them.
The present model can be useful for issues of land policy in Latin American
countries. Appropriate land taxes might correct land prices in economies where
they are above the discounted present value of agricultural inﬂows, inducing
land redistribution from large landowners to more productive small peasants
[Deininger and Feder (2000)]. We have argued that the implementation of such
taxes comprises both land and output taxes.
15Appendix
PROOF. [Lemma 3] Let (t,A,T) be an implementable allocation piecewise
































































and, switching θ and ˆ θ, dividing by
³
θ − ˆ θ
´
and taking ˆ θ → θ, the function Π
is proved to be piecewise C1 and
d
dθ
Π(θ|θ)=Qθ (A,θ)+φθ (T,θ) a.s. for all θ ∈ Θ.
Repeating this computation considering
³
θ − ˆ θ
´2
,w eg e t
QAθ (A,θ) ˙ A + φTθ(T,θ) ˙ T ≥ 0 a.s. for all θ ∈ Θ.
PROOF. [Lemma 4] Notice that we only need to check condition (IC2)f o r
every θ ∈ Θ. For all θ ∈ ΘC,w ec a nd i ﬀerentiate (5) to obtain ˙ A∗∗ = ˙ T∗∗ =
−
ΨAθ+ΨTθ
ΨAA+ΨTT. Hence, (IC2) can be written as
−
(QAθ + φTθ)(ΨAθ + ΨTθ)
ΨAA + ΨTT
≥ 0.
Assumption (A3) assures that the denominator is always negative. Substitut-
ing the deﬁnition of Ψ, the numerator can be expressed by
−(QAθ + φTθ)
"








which is nonpositive under (A4) and (A5).
For θ ∈ ΘU,w eg e tA∗∗ = −
ΨAθ
ΨAA and T∗∗ = −
ΨTθ
ΨTT. Substituting Ψ, condition






















16w h i c hi st r u eu n d e r( A 3 )a n d( A 4 ) .
PROOF. [Proposition 5] Let Q = Q(A,θ) denote the agricultural produc-
tion. Since QA (A,θ) > 0, we can use the implicit function theorem to deﬁne
af u n c t i o nA = A(Q,θ). Given the linear tax scheme t(Q,T)=α(Q)Q +
β (T)T + γ (Q,T),at y p eθ farmer chooses agricultural production and farm
size in order to solve:
max
t,A,T Q + φ(T,θ) − wA(Q,θ) − pT − t(Q,T)
subject to A(Q,θ) ≤ T.T h eﬁrst-order conditions of this choice, after some
manipulation, is given by:
QA = w + µ + αQA + α





φT = p − µ + β + β




where µ is the Lagrangean multiplier. From (6) and (7) we can deﬁne α and
β in order to match the solution of system (5).
For every θ ∈ ΘU,t h ef o l l o w i n gd i ﬀerential system can deﬁne α and β in order




















˜ Q∈projQΩU: ˜ Q≤/ Q


















Analogously, for every farmer of type θ ∈ ΘC, the optimal tax mechanism can
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